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YOU CATCH MORE FLIES WITH HONEY: 
REEVALUATING THE ERRONEOUS PREMISES OF THE 
MILITARY EXCEPTION TO TITLE VII 
Craig Westergard*
Discrimination is a problem in the military. Though Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination 
in the “military departments,” courts have held that the statute 
does not apply to members of the military. The primary 
justification for this judge-made exception is that Title VII suits 
might have an adverse effect on military discipline. In their haste 
to condemn suits for military discrimination, however, courts 
tend to overlook the negative effects discrimination has on 
discipline, as well as the positive effects of diversity. This Note 
calls upon Congress to abrogate the military exception to Title 
VII; in the alternative, it argues that courts should reconsider the 
exception in light of discrimination’s true effects. 
In addition to its eroded policy foundations, the judicial 
exception to Title VII contradicts the ordinary language of the 
statute. The term “military departments” naturally includes 
servicepersons, who are employees, and there is no compelling 
reason to depart from the statute’s ordinary meaning. The 
exception is also contrary to the statute’s broad remedial purpose 
and much of the legislative history surrounding Title VII. The 
rationales the circuit courts use to conclude that members of the 
military cannot bring Title VII claims are inconsistent and 
contradictory, and the exception has resulted in confusion when 
applied to quasi-military personnel. As such, the military 
exception to Title VII should be abandoned—left in the past along 
with other vestiges of discrimination. 
* J.D., April 2020, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Thanks 
to Professor Michalyn Steele for providing feedback and direction for this Note. 
Thanks to Professor Shawn Nevers for help with its publication. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin with respect to the terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.1 In 1972, Congress expressly extended 
these protections to employees of the military departments.2
Despite the seemingly plain language of Title VII, courts have 
barred servicepersons3 from bringing claims for employment 
discrimination under Title VII and other statutes.4 While 
various other statutes and internal regulations attempt to 
combat discrimination against servicepersons, discrimination 
within the military remains a problem.5
This Note recommends that Congress abrogate the military 
exception to Title VII. In the alternative, it suggests that courts 
reevaluate the exception. Part I describes the military’s ongoing 
discrimination problem, the history of Title VII and the military 
exception to the statute, and the additional statutory protections 
that are offered to servicepersons. Part II.A then analyzes the 
ordinary meaning of the term “military departments” and the 
definition of “employee.” Part II.B surveys the legislative history 
surrounding Title VII. Part II.C analyzes the policies upon which 
the judicial exception for the military is premised. Part II.D 
notes the confusion the exception has caused among courts. This 
Note concludes by calling upon the legislature and the judiciary 
to overturn the military exception to Title VII. 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e—2000e-17 (2018)). Other statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of other 
untoward factors, including pregnancy, age, and disability. See, e.g., Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(k) (2018)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 
81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2018)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101—12213 (2018)). 
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2018)). 
3. This Note uses “servicepersons” to refer to uniformed personnel of the United 
States military, including officers, enlisted persons, and reservists. 
4. E.g., Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223-26 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 986 (1978); Gonzalez v. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983). 
5. See infra Part I.A. 
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Military’s Discrimination Problem 
The United States military has a problem with 
discrimination. Over the course of the military’s history, 
discrimination has come in various shapes and sizes, from 
segregating African-American troops,6 to prohibiting women 
from serving in combat roles,7 to the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy,8 to the Trump administration’s recent attempts to 
ban transgender servicepersons from the military.9 Because 
courts have largely held that Title VII does not apply to the 
military, discrimination which would clearly be unlawful in the 
rest of the public sector and in the private sector may be 
allowable in the case of military personnel.10 While the military 
has made strides over the past half century in desegregating 
troops and implementing official policies prohibiting 
discrimination, in practice it continues to discriminate on the 
basis of protected attributes.11
The military’s discrimination problem is clearly seen with 
regard to race. For hundreds of years, racial segregation in both 
society and the military was the norm.12 After the Civil War, 
segregation remained entrenched in everyday life, the law, and 
6. James Burk & Evelyn Espinoza, Race Relations Within the U.S. Military, 38 ANN.
REV. SOC. 401, 402 (2012). 
7. Jill E. Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 104–08 (2008). 
8. G. Dean Sinclair, Homosexuality and the Military: A Review of the Literature, 56 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 701, 708 (2009); see also Lindsay G. Stevenson, Note, Military 
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and the 
Solomon Amendment, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1331 (2004) (discussing the history of the 
military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy). The policy was repealed by the Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3516, (2010) (repeal 
codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2018)). 
9. Erik Larson, Trump’s Military Trans Ban Same as Before, Judge Says,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-
14/trump-s-updated-military-trans-ban-is-same-as-before-judge-says (summarizing 
these attempts). 
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 986; Gonzelez v. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (1983). But see Hill v. 
Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1236–37 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
11. See Burk & Espinoza, supra note 6, at 402 (describing the history of 
improvements in race relations within the military). 
12. Burk & Espinoza, supra note 6, at 402 (describing the history of improvements in 
race relations within the military).
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the military.13 World War II marked a turning point, however, 
and as African-American soldiers returned home, several well-
published incidences of violence against African-American 
veterans,14 along with political pressures of the burgeoning Cold 
War,15 began to shift opinions within the Truman 
administration. In 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed an 
executive order mandating racial integration in the military.16
The military’s taste for discrimination was not to be eradicated 
so easily, however. Minorities, particularly African-Americans, 
were often assigned to low-skill, limiting roles in the infantry, or 
were required to wait upon white officers well into the 1960s.17
Researchers have found that discrimination against minorities is 
still seen in the care given to wounded veterans, the 
administration of military justice, and officer promotion rates.18
The discrepancies which characterize this last practice are 
statistically significant even when compared to the population of 
minorities in the military instead of the population at large.19
The military’s taste for discrimination on the basis of sex is 
13. See generally Manning Marable, The Military, Black People, and the Racist State: 
A History of Coercion, 12 BLACK SCHOLAR 6 (1981); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
14. Desegregation of the Armed Forces, HARRY S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. &
MUSEUM,
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/ind
ex.php?action=bg (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). 
15. Patrick Feng, Executive Order 9981: Integration of the Armed Forces, NAT’L
MUSEUM OF THE U.S. ARMY (Jan. 28, 2015), https://armyhistory.org/executive-order-
9981-integration-of-the-armed-forces/. 
16. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. § 722 (1948) (“there shall be equality of treatment 
and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, 
religion or national origin”).  
17. Mary C. Griffin, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for 
Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2084–85 (1987). This resistance to 
the order was motivated both by animosity towards the new policy and general 
reluctance in the face of change. See Desegregation of the Armed Forces, supra note 
14. 
18. Burk & Espinoza, supra note 6, at 414. The study found no evidence of 
discrimination in admission to the enlisted ranks or in the risk of death in combat, 
however. Burk & Espinoza, supra note 6, at 414.; See generally DON CHRISTENSEN &
YELENA TSILKER, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN MILITARY JUSTICE: FINDINGS OF 
SUBSTANTIAL AND PERSISTENT RACIAL DISPARITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM (May 5, 2017), https://www.protectourdefenders.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Report_20.pdf (supporting these findings). 
19. Griffin, supra note 17, at 2084–85. These discrepancies are noteworthy given 
that there are more minorities serving in the military than there are in the 
population at large. Griffin, supra note 17, at 2084–85.  
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less covert. Women were not allowed to serve in the military 
prior to 1948, and they were barred from all combat roles until 
1991.20 Discrimination against servicewomen, though no longer 
officially sanctioned, is still commonplace. One expert describes 
a multitude of discriminatory sentiments harbored by officers 
and enlisted soldiers alike, including: women are not real 
soldiers; women who join the military are not ladylike; women 
servicepersons are lesbians or sexually promiscuous; and the 
military teaches men to be violent and so their violence towards 
servicewomen is excusable.21 These attitudes within the military 
foster a nurturing environment for sexual harassers and an 
apathetic one for victims.22
While Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell has at least nominally been 
repealed with respect to LGBT servicepersons, transgender 
individuals are still subject to widespread discrimination in the 
military. Under the Obama administration, transgender persons 
were allowed to serve in the military, but they were more likely 
to experience adverse employment actions and harassment than 
their heterosexual counterparts.23 In July 2017, President 
Trump unexpectedly tweeted a reversal of this Obama 
administration policy, citing “tremendous medical costs and 
disruption” and the erosion of “military readiness and unit 
cohesion.”24 The ban was enjoined by several federal courts.25
The White House issued a more nuanced—though still 
20. See Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, §§210, 
502, 62 Stat. 356; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 531(a)(1), (b)(1), 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991); see also
Hasday, supra note 7, at 104–08 (discussing the history of women and the military). 
21. Michael I. Spak and Alice M. McCart, Effect of Military Culture on Responding to 
Sexual Harassment: The Warrior Mystique, 83 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80 (2004) 
(summarizing these and other problems). 
22. See id. at 81–86; see also Overview of the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment 
and Violence at the Military Service Academies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Military Personnel of the H. Comm. On Armed Services, 115th Cong. 80–82 (2017) 
(official statement of Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr.) (detailing attitudes 
and beliefs that reinforce the problem of sexual harassment at the military 
academies); H.R. REP. NO. 113-102, at 140–64 (2013) (describing incidences of sexual 
assault as well as proposed legislation). 
23. Jack Harrison-Quintana & Jody L. Herman, Still Serving in Silence: 
Transgender Service Members and Veterans in the National Transgender 
Discrimination Survey, 3 LGBTQ POLICY J. 1, 4 (2013). 
24. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Helene Cooper, Trump Says Transgender People Will 
Not Be Allowed in the Military, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/politics/trump-transgender-military.html. 
25. See, e.g., Karnoski v. Trump, 2017 WL 6311305 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
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discriminatory—policy in March 2018, which was enjoined for 
similar reasons.26 Several bills have been introduced to address 
this issue and are currently being considered by Congress.27 This 
series of events shows that overt discrimination against 
transgender persons is widespread in the military, and less 
blatant discrimination against women and minorities is still 
pervasive.28
B. The History of Title VII 
While Title VII was not specifically enacted to redress 
discrimination in the military, its historical context reveals its 
broad remedial purpose. The statute is cast against the United 
States’ history of black slavery and the subordination of 
women.29 After the Civil War, in which slavery in the American 
South was forcibly prohibited by the military, African-Americans 
in both the North and South were subject to prejudice and 
exploitation in employment, and many were worse off than they 
were before the Civil War.30 The status of African-Americans 
improved only marginally under Jim Crow, and African-
American employees and job-applicants were still frequently 
discriminated against during the 1950s and 1960s.31
26. Sophie Tatum, White House Announces Policy to Ban Most Transgender People 
from Serving in Military, CNN (Mar. 24, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/23/politics/transgender-white-house/index.html; 
Larson, supra note 9. 
27. See, e.g., H.R. 4041, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 1820, 115th Cong. (2018). 
28. Discrimination on the basis of national origin, age, religion, disability, etc. are 
also problems in the military. See, e.g., Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 699 F. Supp. 
1429, 1432 (D. Haw. 1987) (national origin); Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Protections Against 
Discrimination Afforded to Uniformed Military Personnel: Sources and Directions, 46 
MO. L. REV. 265, 286–87, 299, 306 (1981) (age; religion; and disability). The military’s 
ineffective internal remedies are discussed infra Part I.D. 
29. Cynthia Elaine Tompkins, Title VII at 50: The Landmark Law Has Significantly 
Impacted Relationships in the Workplace and Society, But Title VII Has Not Reached 
Its True Potential, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 701 (2015) (describing how white men 
viewed blacks as property). Though Title VII included sex as a protected class, the 
statute’s legislative history shows that remedying sex discrimination was probably 
not its principal purpose. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 431, 441–43 (1966). As such, this section focuses on the history of 
employment discrimination against African-Americans. 
30. See Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact 
Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 262–63 (2011) (describing the years following the Civil 
War as the “nadir” of employment opportunities for African-Americans). 
31. Scholars have observed that the employment discrimination that directly 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was directly preceded by 
unprecedented racial and social turbulence. The Civil Rights 
Movement, including such notable figures as Rosa Parks in the 
Montgomery bus boycott and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the 
march on Washington, D.C., called the nation’s attention to 
racial inequality generally, and President John F. Kennedy set 
his sights on employment discrimination in particular.32
Literally hundreds of bills were rejected by the legislature before 
one was finally accepted.33 The legislation that became the Civil 
Rights Act spent an extraordinary amount of time in committee, 
and was filibustered by Senate Democrats for sixty days.34 After 
years of political strife—and centuries of societal 
discrimination—President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil 
Rights Act into law in 1964.35
Title VII of the act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin with respect to the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.36 The act also 
contains a private cause of action, which has essentially five 
elements: first, the employer must meet the statute’s coverage 
requirements; second, the plaintiff must belong to a protected 
class; third, the plaintiff must be qualified for the position in 
question; fourth, an adverse employment decision must occur; 
and, fifth, the decision must have been due to race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.37 The phrase “adverse 
employment action” includes any serious, material change in the 
terms or conditions of employment.38 The phrase “because of” 
preceded the enactment of the Civil Rights Act was “not so much a problem of 
blatant exclusion, but of business practices that reinforced the effects of past 
exclusion” attributable to “complicated, deeply rooted, and structural” problems. Id. 
at 286 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
32. Tompkins, supra note 29, at 774–82. Several pieces of civil rights legislation were 
passed during this time period, but none had the scope or import of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634; Civil 
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86; Vaas, supra note 29, at 431 
(characterizing these pieces of legislation as failures). 
33. Vaas, supra note 29, at 431 n.2. 
34. Tompkins, supra note 29, at 785–92. 
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e—2000e-17 (2018)). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018). 
37. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
38. See, e.g., Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000). Such a 
change might take the form of termination, demotion, or a decrease in wages or 
salary. Id.
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covers disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harassment 
liability.39
The courts have also developed evidentiary standards 
alongside the substantive elements of a Title VII claim. A 
plaintiff must first make a prima facie case by proving the 
elements described above; the employer may then refute the 
plaintiff’s case by articulating a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason” for the employment decision; and the plaintiff may then 
show that the proffered reason is merely pretextual and must 
persuade the factfinder of the reality of the unlawful 
discrimination.40
Conspicuously absent from the original act was any mention 
of government employees in general or members of the military 
in particular.41 In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act, 
and inserted the following provision after the original text: “All 
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for 
employment . . . in military departments as defined in section 
102 of title 5 . . . shall be made free from any discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”42 The 
added provision essentially mirrors the original statute, and 
39. Disparate treatment—intentional—discrimination is usually proven through 
direct evidence, such as statements made by a supervisor. E.g., Slack v. Havens, 
1973 WL 339, *5-6 (S.D. Cal. 1973). Disparate impact discrimination, on the other 
hand, may be shown through statistical or other indirect evidence and does not 
require proof of intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (while 
diploma and writing requirements are facially neutral, they may nonetheless be 
invalid because of their disparate effect on a protected class). In 1991, Congress 
passed an amendment to the Civil Rights Act which officially recognized disparate 
impact discrimination. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 105–106, 
105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018)). Perhaps the most 
common variety of discrimination prohibited by Title VII is harassment, which was 
first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1986. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). Hostile work environment claims are, in turn, the most 
common type of harassment and require evidence that the work environment is both 
objectively and subjectively perceived as hostile. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 
U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). Same-sex harassment and “reasonably comparable evils” are 
also prohibited. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 
(1998). Lastly, Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who 
oppose discrimination or participate in investigations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018). 
40. McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
41. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17 (2018)). The original act exempts “the United States” 
from its coverage. This language has essentially been abrogated, but it remains in 
the codified statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018). 
42. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 
111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(a) (2018)). 
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federal civilian employment discrimination jurisprudence has 
developed along roughly the same track as private sector anti-
discrimination law.43 Courts have repeatedly held that Title VII 
is to be construed liberally in light of its historical context and 
broad remedial purpose.44
C. The Military’s Exclusion from Title VII 
Despite Title VII’s plain language including the military 
departments within its scope, servicepersons have been 
judicially-excluded from coverage—either because they are not 
“employees,” or because they are not members of the “military 
departments.”45 The Supreme Court has never taken up the 
question of whether Title VII applies to servicepersons, and so 
the two leading cases on the matter are from the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits: Johnson v. Alexander46 and Gonzalez v. 
Department of the Army,47 respectively. In Johnson, a three-
judge panel for the Eighth Circuit held that servicepersons are 
not employees.48 In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit panel held that 
43. See, e.g., Kristin Sommers Czubkowski, Equal Opportunity: Federal Employees’ 
Right to Sue on Title VII and Tort Claims, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1841, 1844–46 (2013). 
44. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (“Title 
VII . . . must therefore be read against the background of [the statute’s legislative 
history and] historical context”); Quijano v. Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 
131 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Title VII . . . is to be accorded a liberal construction”); Hart v. 
J.T. Baker Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979) (“broad remedial legislation 
such as Title VII is entitled to the benefit of liberal construction”); Craig v. Dep’t of 
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 189, 193 (8th Cir. 1978) (“the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act [of 1972] is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed”); 
Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Title VII is remedial in character 
and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes”); Davis v. Valley Distrib. 
Co., 522 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The Equal Employment Opportunity Act is a 
remedial statute to be liberally construed in favor of victims of discrimination.”), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977). 
45. See Gonzalez v. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. 
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986. 
46. Johnson, 572 F.2d 1219. Because of the Supreme Court’s decision to decline 
certiorari, the other circuits have largely aligned with Johnson. See, e.g., Overton v. 
N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. 
United States, 227 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 
1461–62 (11th Cir. 1990). 
47. Gonzalez, 718 F.2d 926; See also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(d) (2018) (agreeing with 
Johnson and Gonzalez). The EEOC’s regulations were only promulgated in response 
to these decisions, however. See id.
48. Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223. 
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servicepersons are not members of the military departments.49
Though the circuits’ rationales conflict,50 both courts appear to 
have been motivated by the disciplinary and national security 
concerns which underlie the Feres Doctrine, which is discussed 
later in this section and at length in Part II.C.51
In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit first excluded servicepersons 
from coverage under Title VII, reasoning that they were not 
“employees.”52 In that case, an African-American man attempted 
to enlist in the Army but was rejected.53 The man alleged that 
his rejection was due to an Army policy that required applicants 
to disclose whether they had ever been arrested—regardless of 
whether they had ever actually been convicted of a crime.54 The 
man asserted that this policy unlawfully discriminated against 
African-Americans.55 The Eighth Circuit panel did not reach the 
merits of the case, however. Instead, it decided that soldiers 
should not be considered employees under Title VII because, 
first, servicepersons are not free to terminate their association 
with the military; second, the military is not free to terminate its 
association with servicepersons; and third, servicepersons are 
subject to military discipline and military law.56 The court also 
conceded that the military departments “referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 
102 include . . . uniformed personnel” as well as civilian 
employees.57
In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit also chose to limit Title VII’s 
49. Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928. 
50. The circuits not only use different reasoning to conclude that Title VII does not 
apply to members of the military, but the Eighth Circuit expressly contradicts the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that servicepersons are not members of the “military 
departments.” Id. In turn, the Eighth Circuit’s rationale that servicepersons are not 
employees has been cast into doubt by the Supreme Court. See infra Part II.D.1.  
51. See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
52. Johnson, 572 F.2d at 928. This idea appears to have originated with the military. 
See Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D.Mo. 1977). 
53. Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1219–20. 
54. Id at 1220.
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1223 n.4. The first two distinctions regarding free association in 
employment are not on point, since many workers are subject to similar restrictions 
such as non-compete agreements, economic pressures, or employers’ internal policies. 
See Griffin, supra note 17, at 2091. The panel’s final point about discipline seems to 
rely on the Feres Doctrine, which is discussed in greater detail within this section 
and in Part II.C. The panel’s reasoning is contained within a single, short footnote 
that is unaccompanied by citations, and the decision itself is only six pages long. See 
Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223 n.4. 
57. Id. at 1224 (emphasis added).  
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coverage, reasoning that servicepersons were not part of the 
“military departments.”58 In Gonzalez, a Puerto Rican Army 
officer was denied a promotion and then terminated.59 The Army 
eventually reinstated the officer and granted the promotion after 
administrative review, but the man continued his suit for 
national origin discrimination to seek backpay for the years in 
which he had been denied advancement.60 The Ninth Circuit 
panel declined to reach the merits of the case,61 though for 
reasons that are somewhat difficult to follow. The panel first 
contrasted the definition of military departments used by Title 
VII with a definition of “armed forces” found in an entirely 
separate statute.62 In the court’s opinion, “[t]he two differing 
definitions show that Congress intended a distinction between 
‘military departments’ and ‘armed forces,’ the former consisting 
of civilian employees, the latter of uniformed military 
personnel.”63 In support of this conclusion, the panel also cites to 
the legislative history of Title VII,64 the titles of the chapters 
which contain the two definitions,65 and the Eighth Circuit in 
58. Gonzalez v. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983). This expressly 
contradicts the Eighth Circuit. See infra text accompanying note 50. The circuit 
courts’ conflicting rationales are particularly problematic in the case of quasi-
military personnel. See infra Part II.D.2 and Part II.D.3. 
59. Id. at 927. 
60. Id. 
61. See id. at 928.  
62. Id. Title VII refers to 5 U.S.C. § 102, which defines the “military departments” as 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 5 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). The panel contrasted this 
definition with 10 U.S.C. § 101, which defines the “armed forces” as the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. 10 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2018). 
63. Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928. This conclusion does not follow logically. This is first 
because neither definition expressly mentions civilian employees. Second, Congress 
is not prohibited from using synonyms in different statutes. And third, the Marine 
Corps and Coast Guard also employ civilians—excluding civilian employees of only 
those branches would border on absurdity. 
64. Id. As is shown in Part II.B, however, justifying the military’s exclusion from 
Title VII through the statute’s legislative history is unconvincing and, like many 
analyses that rely on legislative history, may be compared to looking over a crowd 
and picking out one’s friends. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
65. Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928 n.1. 5 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) is titled “Government 
Organization and Employees,” while 10 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) is titled “Armed Forces.” 
This is probably the most persuasive evidence proffered by the court, even though 
the titles of statutes are not typically given great weight by the Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892) (“The title 
of an act cannot control its words, but may furnish some aid in showing what was in 
the mind of the legislature.”). 
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Johnson.66
The main policy underlying these decisions is known as the 
Feres Doctrine,67 or alternatively as the Separate Community 
Doctrine.68 In general, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
abrogates the federal government’s sovereign immunity for tort 
claims,69 however, the Feres Doctrine provides an exception. In 
the absence of an express congressional command to the 
contrary, Feres bars soldiers’ suits for service-related injuries 
because of concerns for military discipline.70 The doctrine first 
developed within the context of the FTCA, but has since been 
expanded to include Title VII claims by military personnel.71
Courts use it to assume away arguments that civil rights 
statutes, including Title VII, should apply to the military. The 
Feres Doctrine is shorthand for the idea that the military is too 
important to be burdened by rights that are otherwise viewed as 
fundamental. The doctrine emphasizes the importance of 
discipline in the military, the burden the military would bear if 
it were charged with safeguarding servicepersons’ civil rights, 
and the primacy of national security concerns.72 A secondary 
66. Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928; see generally Johnson, 572 F.2d 1219. As of this 
writing, the only court to hold that Title VII does apply to members of the military 
did so over thirty years ago and denied relief on other grounds. Hill v. Berkman, 635 
F. Supp. 1228, 1236–37 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
67. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (estate of an active-duty soldier who 
was killed because of the negligence of others denied relief under the FTCA); see also,
E. Roy Hawkins, The Justiciability of Claims Brought by National Guardsmen Under 
the Civil Rights Statutes for Injuries Suffered in the Course of Military Service, 125
MILT. L. REV. 99, 100 (1989). 
68. The Separate Community Doctrine, which views the military as beyond the reach 
of most laws, is a direct relative of the Feres Doctrine. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 
345 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1953). This Note uses the phrase “Feres Doctrine” to refer to 
both. 
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2018). 
70. Hawkins, supra note 67, at 100; see also Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.  
71. E.g., Walch v. Adjutant Gen. Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 296 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Originally, the Supreme Court indicated that this doctrine applied only to injuries 
sustained during combat or times of war. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 138–39. The doctrine 
was then extended to cover injuries incidental to military service—including 
employment discrimination. E.g., Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 397-98 (9th Cir. 
1988); Holdiness v. Stroud, 808 F.2d 417, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1987); Bois v. Marsh, 801 
F.2d 462, 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Other courts have relied on the policies which 
underlie Feres without citing the case. See, e.g., Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1223 n.4. 
72. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1983); United States v. 
Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). Another justification for excluding some members 
of the military from bringing Title VII claims is that, in some contexts, religion, sex, 
or national origin may represent a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). See 
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policy justification employed by some courts is that, because 
military responsibilities are included in Congress’s 
constitutionally enumerated powers, Title VII liability in 
military cases would raise separation of powers issues.73
In addition to excluding servicepersons’ Title VII claims, 
courts have excluded claims brought under the various Civil 
War-era civil rights statutes, such as claims for unlawful 
abridgement of contract and conspiracy to interfere with civil 
rights.74 In addition, courts have declined to recognize various 
discrimination-related Constitutional torts in the context of 
military employment.75
D. Unique Protections Offered to Members of the 
 Military
Despite their exclusion from Title VII, members of the 
military are afforded a number of unique statutory protections. 
These include required reinstatement in the private sector, 
hiring preference in the public sector, lending protections, and 
internal administrative remedies for discrimination. 
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) prohibits discrimination and 
retaliation against servicepersons by private employers.76 It 
requires reinstatement so long as servicepersons give private 
employers advance notice, serve in the military for less than five 
years while maintaining private employment, and return to 
work in a timely manner after the conclusion of each tour of 
duty.77 USERRA requires that servicepersons be reinstated to 
equivalent positions with the same benefits they would have 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2018). This occurs most often in the case of sex 
discrimination, though, as the military’s increasing acceptance of servicewomen 
shows, the defense is not usually well-founded. See Hasday, supra note 7, at 104–08. 
73. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also, e.g., Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299-301. The 
constitutional considerations of the Feres Doctrine are discussed in detail in Part 
II.C.3. 
74. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2018); Brown v. GSA, 
425 U.S. 820 (1976). 
75. See, e.g., Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 (equal protection); Griffin, supra note 17, at 
2082–83 n.4 (discussing courts’ applications of the equal protection doctrine as it 
relates to employment discrimination). 
76. 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2018). See generally, Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Pub. L. No. 103–353, 108 Stat. 3149 
(codified at amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335 (2018)). 
77. See 38 U.S.C. § 4312 (2018). 
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enjoyed absent military service.78 USERRA also provides other 
protections, such as a prohibition against terminating a former 
serviceperson without cause for at least six months following 
that person’s return.79
Qualified veterans also receive hiring preference in federal 
employment and may apply for positions that are not made 
available to other candidates.80 According to their qualifications, 
veterans receive either ten-point, five-point, or zero-point 
preference in relation to other applicants.81 To be eligible, 
veterans must provide documentation of their service and 
usually must have served during certain periods corresponding 
with various wars and military campaigns.82 Some protections 
require that the veteran be separated from the military for at 
least three years, and others require the serviceperson to have 
sustained a disability or to have received a purple heart award.83
The Servicemembers Relief Act84 provides various financial 
protections to members of the military and their families. Most 
notably, it entitles servicepersons to interest rates that are 
capped at six percent.85 It also prevents lenders from foreclosing 
on or evicting servicepersons for up to nine months following the 
serviceperson’s return from duty.86
78. 38 U.S.C. § 4313 (2018). In the event such a position is unavailable, USERRA 
requires that the serviceperson be reemployed in a substantially similar position. Id. 
79. 38 U.S.C. § 4316(c) (2018). 
80. These preferences are provided by the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, Pub. L. 
No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387 (codified at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 38 
U.S.C. (2018)) and the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105–339, 112 Stat. 3182 (codified at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 38 U.S.C. 
(2018)). 
81. These point allocations anticipate that government agencies will use numerical 
or categorical ratings systems. Veterans’ Preference, OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., 
https://www.fedshirevets.gov/job-seekers/veterans-preference/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2019). Zero-point preference refers to a situation where a veteran and a non-veteran 
are equally qualified, in which case the position would be awarded to the veteran. Id. 
82. 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (2018); Veterans’ Preference, supra note 81. 
83. 5 U.S.C. § 2108. There are a number of exceptions to these protections, such as 
for highly-skilled scientific positions or exempted service positions. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 
302.203 (2018); Veterans’ Preference, supra note 81. The Department of Labor is 
responsible for administration of the statutes which provide veterans’ preference, 
and the agency’s decisions are appealable, first to the Merit Systems Protection 
Board and then judicially. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a–b (2018). 
84. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901—4043 (2018). 
85. 50 U.S.C. § 3937(a)(1) (2018). 
86. 50 U.S.C. § 3953 (2018) (foreclosures); 50 U.S.C. § 3951 (2018) (evictions). See 
generally Philip J. Bagley, The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act: A Survey, 45
MILT. L. REV 1 (1969). The Department of Justice may bring enforcement actions on 
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There are various other remedies for civil rights violations—
available to servicepersons and ordinary citizens alike—
scattered throughout the United States Code. Perhaps the most 
important of these is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a private 
right of action for violations of state, federal, and constitutional 
law.87 Also notable are Title II and Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act, which prohibit certain kinds of discrimination in places of 
public accommodation and housing, respectively.88
There are also internal remedies available to 
servicepersons, but they are ineffective and show why a Title VII 
remedy for discrimination is needed. The military’s two major 
anti-discrimination regimes are the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) and the Department of Defense’s Equal 
Opportunity Program.89 Under the UCMJ, servicepersons are 
required to report allegations of discrimination to their 
commanding officers before proceeding up the chain of 
command.90 This becomes problematic when the allegations are 
about a serviceperson’s commanding officer, and such complaints 
tend to lead to suppression and retaliation.91 While 
servicepersons are permitted to report discrimination to other 
officers afterwards, this option is little known and seldom 
utilized.92 Moreover, commanding officers are free to retaliate 
against servicepersons in the meantime, without administrative 
review, by demoting them, suspending them, or docking their 
pay.93 Because the UCMJ was designed to approximate the 
behalf of aggrieved servicepersons, and the act also creates a private right of action. 
50 U.S.C. §§ 4041–4042 (2018). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); Harris, supra note 28, at 294. 
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2018) (public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619 (2018) (housing); Harris, supra note 28, at 309. 
89. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2018) (UCMJ); 32 C.F.R. § 191 (2018) (Department of 
Defense’s Equal Opportunity Program). 
90. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2018); see also Griffin, supra note 17, at 2087–89. At present, the 
Air Force is the only branch that allows servicepersons to bypass commanding 
officers to report discrimination. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-96-9,
MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: PROBLEMS WITH SERVICES’ COMPLAINT SYSTEMS ARE 
BEING ADDRESSED BY DOD, 3 (1996).  
91. Griffin, supra note 17, at 2087–89. 
92. Rod Powers, How to File an Article 138 Complaint Under the UCMJ, BALANCE
CAREERS (July 8, 2018), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/article-138-complaint-
ucmj-3332814. 
93. See 10 U.S.C § 815(b) (allowing commanding officers to reduce certain officers’ 
pay by 50% over two months, to deduct up to seven days’ pay from ordinary 
servicepersons, and to demote individuals serving beneath them to the next lower 
paygrade—all without administrative review). 
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criminal law rather than employment law,94 it is ill-equipped to 
resolve disputes over adverse employment actions. 
The military’s Equal Opportunity Program is equally 
ineffective. Under the Equal Opportunity Program, 
servicepersons may file discrimination complaints, but the 
complaints are then reported to servicepersons’ commanding 
officers.95 In addition, Congress has found that Equal 
Opportunity Program specialists are generally overworked and 
insufficiently trained, and that they are often lax in following 
procedures and documenting complaints.96 The Equal 
Opportunity Program focuses on providing guidance rather than 
adjudicating individual disputes, and so it is not well-positioned 
to provide individual remedies for military discrimination. 
Neither the UCMJ nor the Equal Opportunity Program 
provide guidelines for investigating complaints, and the legal 
standards that do exist are often ambiguous and inconsistent.97
Neither program designates an official to lead investigations, 
and neither examines complaints thoroughly.98 Each program 
can be rightly described as a “runaround” designed to ensure 
discipline rather than to promote justice.99 Most importantly, 
neither program awards damages to servicepersons who suffer 
from unlawful discrimination.100 Because of this, servicepersons 
have almost no incentive to report discrimination—particularly 
discrimination that is effectuated by their commanding officers. 
The Feres Doctrine precludes review by Article III courts, and so 
servicepersons are usually left without remedy.101 Justice 
Douglas once wrote that “it is the function of the courts to make 
sure . . . that the men and women constituting our Armed Forces 
are treated as honored members of society whose rights do not 
94. See The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UMCJ), MILITARY.COM,
https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/the-uniform-code-of-military-justice-
ucmj.html (last visited June 4, 2019); see generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et. seq. 
95. GAO, supra note 90, at 3-4; Rod Powers, Air Force Military Equal Opportunity 
(MEO) and Sexual Harassment, BALANCE CAREERS (Mar. 21,  2019), 
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/air-force-military-equal-opportunity-sexual-
harassment-3331702. 
96. GAO, supra note 90, at 2-3, 7-10. 
97. Robert D. Smither & Mary Ruth Houston, Racial Discrimination and Forms of 
Redress in the Military, 15 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 459, 463 (1991); Griffin, 
supra note 17, at 2087–89.  
98. Smither & Houston, supra note 97, at 463. 
99. Griffin, supra note 17, at 2087–89. 
100. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2018); 32 C.F.R. § 191 (2018). 
101. Griffin, supra note 17, at 2088–89; Smither & Houston, supra note 97, at 463. 
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turn on the charity of a military commander.”102 In this, courts 
have failed.103
III. DISCUSSION
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, courts barred members of 
the military from seeking remedies under Title VII. These 
decisions used different, faulty analyses to arrive at unjust 
conclusions. First, the plain language of the statute indicates 
that the military falls within the scope of Title VII. Second, the 
broad remedial purpose of the statute indicates that the 
legislature did not intend to exclude the military from coverage. 
Third, policy considerations for discipline and separateness in 
the military are outdated and are secondary to the policies 
espoused by the Civil Rights Act. Finally, the judicial exclusion 
of the military from Title VII has created confusion and 
ambiguity in the lower courts. As such, Congress should act to 
abrogate judicial decisions which are contrary to the nation’s 
established policies. In the alternative, federal courts should 
choose to distinguish earlier decisions barring members of the 
military from exercising their statutory rights under Title VII. 
A. “Military Departments” and “Employees” 
Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll personnel 
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in 
military departments as defined in section 102 of title 5 . . . shall 
be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”104 5 U.S.C. § 102 in turn reads: 
“The military departments are: The Department of the Army. 
The Department of the Navy. The Department of the Air 
102. Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 59–60, (1968). 
103. Though this Note calls upon the judiciary and the legislature to address the 
military’s discrimination problem, another potential solution would be to improve the 
administrative remedies available to servicepersons. This could be done by amending 
the UCMJ or the Department of Defense’s Equal Opportunity Program. These 
regimes could, for instance, be modified to provide for damages. They could also 
implement alternate, anonymous reporting procedures that allow servicepersons to 
circumvent the chain of command. Or they could limit the potential for retaliation by 
commanding officers. These are just a few of the many potential improvements that 
are available. 
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2018). 
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Force.”105
1. Plain Language of the Statute
The first step in statutory interpretation is to find the 
ordinary meaning of the statute’s language.106 The plain 
language of Title VII indicates that members of the military, 
who are employees,107 shall not be subject to discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. An 
ordinary, common sense reading of the phrase “military 
departments” suggests that it includes each department’s 
members.108 A military department itself cannot exist without 
individual constituents; it, like a department in any private 
company, must be composed of managerial, supervisory, and 
other employees. 
The statute does not leave “military departments” 
undefined, however. Instead, it specifically refers to the 
definition found in Title 5 of the United States Code, which 
indicates that these departments are the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force. The ordinary meanings of “Army,” “Navy,” and “Air 
Force” include the enlisted members of each branch.109 Enlisted 
105. 5 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
106. E.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); W. Va. 
Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. 
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 552 (1990), superseded by statute on other grounds, as 
recognized in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
107. See infra Part II.A.3. 
108. The Oxford English Online Dictionary defines “military” as “[r]elating to or 
characteristic of soldiers or armed forces.” Military, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE 
DICTIONARY (2018), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/military  (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018). It defines “department” as “[a] division of a large organization 
such as a government, university, or business, dealing with a specific subject, 
commodity, or area of activity.” Department, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY 
(2018), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/department (last visited Oct. 
26, 2018). See generally, Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) 
(consulting dictionaries to aid in statutory construction). 
109. The Oxford English Online Dictionary defines “the Army” as “[t]he branch of a 
nation’s armed services that conducts military operations on land.” Army, OXFORD 
ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/army (last visited Oct. 26, 2018 PM). It 
defines “the Navy” as “[t]he branch of a nation’s armed services that conducts 
military operations at sea.” Navy, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/navy (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). It 
defines “the Air Force” as “[t]he branch of a nation’s armed services that conducts 
military operations in the air.” Air Force Oxford English Online Dictionary (2018), 
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soldiers, sailors, and airmen are the first individuals who come 
to mind when one thinks of the members of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force. In addition, non-civilians make up the large majority 
of military department personnel.110
It would be an abnormal reading, not an ordinary one, to 
suggest that phrase “military departments” includes only the 
civilian employees of those departments. There is nothing in the 
text of the statute that suggests such a limitation. The statute 
does not read, for instance, “civilians in military departments 
shall be made free from discrimination.” The words “all” and 
“affecting” that precede “military departments” serve to broaden 
the phrase. All personnel actions affecting military employees 
and applicants are included, not just some. Personnel actions 
which merely affect employees and applicants are covered, not 
just actions that are substantial or that pertain to the employee 
or applicant directly. 
When other statutes refer only to civilian employees of 
military departments, they tend to do so expressly.111 The simple 
occurrence of the word “departments” is insufficient to 
contravene the ordinary meaning of “military departments” and 
restrict the phrase to only civilian employees.112
 2. Consistent Usage and Meaningful Variation 
The second step in statutory interpretation is to determine 
whether a well-established cannon of construction dictates a 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/air_force (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
Certainly uniformed soldiers, sailors, and airmen are necessary to conduct military 
operations on land, at sea, and in the air. 
110. Non-civilian members of the military constitute 67.6% of all Department of 
Defense employees. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEMOGRAPHICS: PROFILE OF THE 
MILITARY COMMUNITY iii (2016), 
http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2016-Demographics-
Report.pdf.  
111. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A) (2018) (“employee” means “any individual 
employed by the Government of the United States. . . as a civilian in the military 
departments” under the Fair Labor Standards Act) (emphasis added); 10 U.S.C. § 
2737(a) (2018) (servicepersons and civilians each listed individually with regard to 
liability under the FTCA); 10 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2018) (servicepersons and civilians 
each listed individually with regard to bonus eligibility); see also Griffin, supra note 
17, at 2089–95. 
112. As noted in Part I.C, the Eighth Circuit conceded that the military departments 
“referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 include . . . uniformed personnel” in its decision 
excluding servicepersons from the scope of Title VII. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 
1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978).  
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meaning other than the ordinary one.113 One such cannon is the 
presumption that language within a statute or within a code is 
used consistently, and that variations are thus meaningful.114
One of the most persuasive pieces of evidence that “military 
departments” includes uniformed members of the armed forces 
is that the rest of the Civil Rights Act does not exclude 
servicepersons.115 It would be odd to disallow discrimination in 
places of public accommodation or in housing but exempt 
military installations from these requirements.116 While it is 
true that Title VII may be distinguished from Title II and Title 
VIII since it relates to employment discrimination, the Civil 
Rights Act as a whole prohibits discrimination without regard to 
an individual’s status as a member of the military. The military 
exception that occurs only in Title VII thus borders on the 
absurd.117
The Gonzalez court viewed the term “military departments” 
as it is used in Title VII and as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 102 as 
distinct from the term “armed forces,” which does not appear in 
Title VII and is defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101.118 The best evidence 
for this proposition is that the section’s title, “Armed Forces” 
seems to refer specifically to enlisted servicepersons, since those 
individuals are, at least presumptively, “armed.”119 Evidence 
found in a statute’s title is afforded only a light amount of 
evidentiary weight by courts, however,120 and there is no cannon 
of construction that prohibits Congress from using synonyms in 
entirely separate statutes. 
113. E.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
114. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484–85 (1990); United Sav. Ass’n v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). This presumption is 
stronger when statutes contain similar subject matter. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sec’y of 
Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986). 
115. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a (2018) (public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619 (2018) (Fair Housing Act); Harris, supra note 28, at 308–09. 
116. Admittedly, this is in part because the policy considerations discussed in Part 
II.C below may not attach in such situations. 
117. See infra Part II.B for an analysis of congressional intent. 
118. Gonzalez v. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). Title 10 
defines the armed forces as “the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast 
Guard.” 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (2018). 
119. Compare 5 U.S.C. §§101-105 (2018) (“Organization) with 10 U.S.C. §§101 et. 
seq. (2018) (“Armed Forces”). 
120. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19, 20 n.14 (1981) (“It 
has long been established that the title of an Act cannot enlarge or confer powers.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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In any case, whatever “meaningful” variation exists in the 
definitions found in title 5 and title 10 disappears upon 
examining the terms used within each definition. Both 
definitions include the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the title 
10 definition adds the Marine Corps and Coast Guard.121 Given 
the dictionary definitions of each of these terms, servicepersons 
would seem to be covered—the additions of the Marine Corps 
and the Coast Guard do not change the definitions of the other 
three terms.122 What is more, title 10 defines each military 
department as specifically including the United States Army, 
Navy, Air Force, etc., as well as enlisted individuals and those 
involved in combat.123 The simple use of “armed forces”—which 
has a definition substantially the same as “military 
departments”—in another statute does not contradict the plain 
meaning of Title VII.124
3. Definition of “Employee” 
Servicepersons receive pay in exchange for labor and are not 
independent contractors; as such they are rightly considered 
employees. The Eighth Circuit in Johnson held that 
servicepersons are not employees,125 but this conclusion is 
contradicted by Title VII’s own definition of employee, other 
definitions of the word, and common sense. 
According to Title VII, an employee is “an individual 
121. See 5 U.S.C. §102; 10 U.S.C. §101. 
122. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
123. 10 U.S.C. § 3062(b). “In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, 
includes land combat and service forces . . . . It is responsible for the preparation of 
land forces . . . . The Army consists of (1) the Regular Army, the Army National 
Guard of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the 
United States and the Army Reserve; and (2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or 
conscripted into, the Army without component.” Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 5061-62 
(2018) (Navy); 10 U.S.C. § 8062(b) (2018) (Air Force); 10 U.S.C. § 5063(a) (2018) 
(Marine Corps); Griffin, supra note 17, at 2089–90 n.47. 
124. While Congress could have referred to title 10 instead of title 5 to define 
military departments, inferring legislative intent from Congress’s choice not to do 
something is wrongfooted. E.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 
(1942) (describing the attempt to find meaning in legislative inaction as “the pursuit 
of a mirage”). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988) (arguing that there is some coherence to finding meaning in 
legislative inaction). The similarity of the definitions negates whatever significance 
this Congressional choice might hold. 
125. See Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 986. 
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employed by an employer.”126 This definition is circular, and the 
EEOC has not elaborated on it.127 Therefore, it is helpful to 
consult a dictionary.128 The English Oxford Dictionary defines 
“employee” as “[a] person employed for wages or salary, 
especially at nonexecutive level;”129 it defines “employer” as “[a] 
person or organization that employs people;”130 and it defines 
“employ” as to “[g]ive work to (someone) and pay them for it.”131
These definitions make clear that wages, salary, and the receipt 
of work are the key elements of employment. Servicepersons are 
each individuals, they receive money in exchange for their work, 
and the federal government is a covered employer.132 Therefore, 
an ordinary reading of Title VII’s definition of employee leads to 
the conclusion that servicepersons should be considered 
employees. The Supreme Court has confirmed this reading by 
stating in dicta that the “relationship of the Government to 
members of the military . . . . is . . . that of employer to 
employee.”133
Other definitions of the term “employee” lead to the same 
conclusion. Courts, the Department of Labor, the Internal 
Revenue Service, and other agencies weigh several factors to 
determine whether a worker is an employee.134 First, they 
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2018).  
127. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.702 (2018). 
128. See 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) (memorandum of Sen. Clark to Sen. Dirksen 
stating the word “employer” was “intended to have its common dictionary meaning, 
except as qualified by the Act”); see also, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 
566 U.S. 560 (2012) (consulting dictionaries to aid in statutory construction). 
129. Employee, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/employee (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
130. Employer, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/employer (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
131. Employ, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/employ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
132. Title VII defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has fifteen or more employees,” but it originally excluded the federal 
government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1971). The 1972 amendments changed this by 
including “governments, governmental agencies [and] political subdivisions” within 
the definition of “persons.” Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2018) with 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(b) (2018); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(a) (2018) (federal government is a 
covered employer); Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 831 (1976) (same). 
133. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974). 
134. Though there is no hard and fast definition for what constitutes an “employee,” 
the factors that follow can be adduced from judicial and administrative decisions. 
See, e.g., United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947); Donovan v. Dialamerica 
Marketing, Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985);  
Patricia Davidson, The Definition of Employee under Title VII: Distinguishing 
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consider the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer, 
as evidenced by employer-provided training, supervision, quotas, 
and requirements.135 Second, they consider the continuity of the 
employment relationship, including its relative permanence and 
whether the worker receives regular hours or pay.136 Third, 
courts and agencies consider the worker’s relative independence, 
including whether the worker makes provisions for his or her 
own licensing, advertising, customers, tools, equipment, records, 
and taxes.137 Independence is also evidenced by a worker’s own 
opportunities for profit and loss.138 Last, courts and agencies 
evaluate whether the worker’s contributions are integral to the 
employer’s operations and whether the alleged employee may 
work for competitors.139
Each of these factors mitigates in favor of finding that 
servicepersons are employees. First, the military exercises rigid 
control over servicepersons’ schedules, work locations, living 
quarters, dress, and grooming; it provides servicepersons with 
intensive supervision and training; and commanding officers 
issue orders that cannot be altered or questioned.140 Second, 
while the serviceperson-military relationship is not necessarily 
permanent, neither party may terminate it at will, and 
servicepersons are usually given set hours and regular pay.141
between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203 (1984); 
Alexandre Zucco, Independent Contractors and the Internal Revenue Service’s Twenty 
Factor Test: Perspective on the Problems of Today and the Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 
WAYNE L. REV. 599, 602–06 (2011). The Eighth Circuit seemed to believe that 
servicepersons are similar to independent contractors because they are not at will 
employees. See Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978) (“An enlisted man in the Army . . . is not free to quit his 
‘job,’ nor is the Army free to fire him from his employment.”). 
135. Zucco, supra note 134, at 602-06. 
136. Zucco, supra note 134, at 602-06. 
137. Zucco, supra note 134, at 602-06.  
138. Zucco, supra note 134, at 605.   
139. Zucco, supra note 134, at 602-06.  
140. See, e.g., Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court’s 
Jurisprudence in Military Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557, 559 (1994) 
(describing these aspects of military service). 
141. See, e.g., 37 U.S.C. § 1014 (2018) (military pay is ordinarily distributed at least 
monthly); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DD Form 4/1, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document 
Armed Forces of the United States (Oct. 2007), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/forms/dd/dd0004.pdf (enlisted 
servicepersons cannot resign their employment and can only be discharged under 
certain circumstances); see also 37 U.S.C. § 1005 (2018) (members of the Army and 
Air Force must be paid regularly). 
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Third, servicepersons lack independence because they do not 
invest in their own tools or equipment and do not engage in 
other profit-driven activities. Lastly, servicepersons’ individual 
contributions are integral to the military’s success and they are 
barred from working for “competitors”—which would usually be 
deemed treason in this context.142 It is also worth noting that 
most servicepersons are completely reliant on the military for 
employment,143 and they perform many of the same technical, 
clerical, and administrative duties that civilian employees do.144
Servicepersons also meet the common law agency test for 
whether an individual is an employee because the military 
benefits from the work they perform, rigidly controls their 
conduct, and assents to the formation of the relationship.145 The 
military benefits from servicepersons’ efforts in fulfilling its 
national security objectives — indeed servicepersons’ 
contributions are essential. The military tells servicepersons 
how to dress, when to arise and retire, where to live, and 
generally controls the minute details of their lives. The parties’ 
assent to the agency relationship when an applicant enlists in 
the military and the military accepts his or her enlistment. 
Servicepersons are thus employees under the common law’s 
traditional definition of employee. 
The ordinary meaning of employee, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the word, and its definition in various other 
contexts show that servicepersons should be considered 
employees. 
B. Congressional Intent 
In examining congressional intent, it is important to 
remember that legislative history is not the law.146 The textual 
142. See generally, e.g., United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954); United 
States v. Monti, 100 F. Supp. 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). 
143. This is one reason why Congress has enacted statutes like USERRA and the 
Veterans’ Preference Act to help former-servicepersons transition to employment in 
the private sector. See infra Part I.D.  
144. Griffin, supra note 17, at 2098. 
145. E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) 
(summarizing , the application of the common law test of agency where Congress has 
not defined a key term, relating to employment status). See generally, Ronald C. 
Wyse, A Framework of Analysis for the Law of Agency, 40 MONT. L. REV. 31, 33–35 
(1979).  
146. See, e.g., In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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analysis conducted in Part II.A takes precedence over anything 
gleaned from committee reports, hearings, bills, and other 
legislative documents. Legislative history may supplement the 
text, but where the text is clear, as in Title VII’s application to 
members of the military, congressional intent is only of 
secondary concern.147
1. The Broad Remedial Purpose of Title VII 
The text nonetheless evinces Congress’s intent for expansive 
Title VII coverage. Congress defined “employee” circularly as “an 
individual employed by an employer” and left “discrimination” 
undefined.148 The broad definition of employee indicates 
inclusivity rather than exclusivity, and the term 
“discrimination” is likewise free of either general or specific 
limitations. In addition, Title VII was amended to cover federal 
employees in 1972.149 This amendment indicates that Congress 
intended to expand rather than contract the act’s coverage. 
The historical context surrounding Title VII reveals that the 
principal evil which Congress sought to remedy was 
discrimination.150 The United States’ history of slavery, Jim 
Crow, the repression of women, and the Civil Rights Movement 
gives context to the Civil Rights Act’s broader purposes.151 The 
inclusion of attributes besides race and color in Title VII’s 
protections shows that Congress intended the act to eliminate 
untoward discrimination in all its forms.152
Nowhere in Title VII is the military specifically omitted 
from coverage, and Congress might not have felt the need to 
address intra-military discrimination given President Truman’s 
1948 executive order desegregating the military.153 Even if 
Congress did not specifically include uniformed members of the 
military within Title VII’s coverage, the act’s broad remedial 
147. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 458 (2010). 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2018). 
149. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2018)). 
150. The Supreme Court frequently exaines historical context when interpreting 
statutes. See, e.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).  
151. See infra Part I.B. 
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2018). 
153. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948). See generally, Burk 
& Espinoza, supra note 6, at 402. 
2019] YOU CATCH MORE FLIES WITH HONEY 241 
purpose includes eliminating discrimination within the 
military.154
2. Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is 
inconclusive. This is in part because the legislative history is 
largely recorded in debates between members of Congress, 
statements of the act’s opponents and proponents, and hundreds 
of accepted and rejected amendments, rather than in 
authoritative committee reports.155 As such, the legislative 
history of Title VII is often difficult to parse and unfamiliar to 
courts.156 It may still provide some insights, however. 
Most importantly, the enacting Senate included a proviso in 
the definition of employer which established the federal 
government’s policy of non-discrimination in employment.157
This explicit statement of policy shows that Title VII was 
originally intended to extend to the federal government, and 
thus the broad remedial purpose of the original act applies to the 
federal government’s component parts, including the military. In 
addition, the 1964 Congress considered a number of bills which 
specifically addressed discrimination in both the public and 
private sectors, indicating that the legislature was cognizant of 
the federal government’s discrimination problem and intended 
for Title VII to address it.158
On the other hand, of course, these bills were not enacted,159
154. “[S]tatutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); 
see also supra note 44 and accompanying citations. But see, generally, Harry C. 
Beans, Sex Discrimination in the Military, 67 MIL. L. REV. 19, 42 (1975) (asserting 
that Congress did not intend to include uniformed military personnel in the 1972 
amendments to Title VII); Chuck Henson, Title VII Works - That’s Why We Don’t Like 
It, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41 (2012) (arguing that Title VII’s purpose 
was to prohibit the most obvious and harmful forms of discrimination while 
preserving employers’ rights to discriminate in less harmful ways). 
155. Vaas, supra note 29, at 457–58. 
156. See Vaas, supra note 29.  
157. This proviso stated, “it shall be the policy of the United States to insure [sic] 
equal employment opportunities for Federal employees without discrimination.” Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, 254 (now codified with slightly 
different wording at 5 U.S.C. § 7201(b) (2018)). This policy statement is not 
legislative history, as such, but it is probably less authoritative than the text.  
158. Vaas, supra note 29, at 431.  
159. Vaas, supra note 29, at 431.  
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which may just as easily evince Congress’s intent to exclude 
federal employees, which would presumably include members of 
the military. Moreover, Congress did not enact federal 
employment protections as part of the of 1964 act, and the 
statute specifically exempted the United States from coverage.160
 3. Legislative History of the 1972 Amendments 
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII 
is likewise inconclusive. The legislature did not directly address 
whether the term “military departments” was intended to 
include servicepersons or merely civilian employees of the 
military departments, and committee reports and statements 
from hearings are ambiguous. In one hearing, for instance, the 
United States Civil Service Commission submitted a document 
which stated that “the military departments have adopted new 
equal employment opportunity plans of action.”161 The 
commission did not specify what departments it was referring to, 
however, and it did not address whether the plans applied to 
servicepersons.162 In another instance, the amendments’ 
sponsor, Senator Alan Cranston, stated that the legislation 
would, “[f]or the first time, permit Federal employees to sue the 
Federal Government in discrimination cases.”163 But the senator 
did not define what he meant by “federal employees” or “federal 
government.”164
There is evidence that the 1972 Congress intended an 
expansive reading of Title VII. One Senate report stated that the 
“principal purpose” of the statute “is to amend title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission with a method for enforcing the rights 
160. “The term ‘employer’ . . . does not include . . . the United States.” Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7201 
(2018)). While this exemption is still a part of the United States Code, its meaning 
was abrogated by the 1972 amendments to Title VII. See Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-16 (2018)). 
161. A Bill to Further Promote Equal Employment Opportunities for American 
Workers: Hearing on H.R. 1746 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the H. 
Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong. 373 (1971). 
162. See id.
163. Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971, S. 2515, 92d Cong., 
in 118 CONG. REC. 4929 (1972). 
164. See id.
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of those workers who have been subjected to unlawful 
employment practices.”165 Members of the military were—and 
still are—subjected to unlawful employment discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, and so 
the amendments appear to apply to them. In another instance, 
one senator declared, “[t]here is no reason why a Federal 
employee should not have the same private right of action 
enjoyed by individuals in the private sector.”166 The policy of 
equality this statement is premised on is reasonably applicable 
to members of the military. 
Another purpose contemplated by the legislature was the 
federal government’s role as a bellwether and an example. The 
federal government’s “policies, actions, and programs strongly 
influence the activities of all other enterprises, organizations 
and groups. In no area is government action more important 
than in         . . . civil rights.”167 This desire to set an example is 
likewise applicable to prohibiting employment discrimination in 
the military. 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that Congress 
either did not contemplate Title VII’s application to members of 
the military when it enacted the 1972 amendments or that it 
specifically intended to exclude servicepersons from the act’s 
coverage. The legislative record focuses on the effects of systemic 
discrimination against minorities and women in federal civilian 
positions, not in the military.168 Congress also referred to the 
fact that “the federal government employs 2.6 million persons,” 
and the district court in Johnson believed that because the 
membership of the armed forces decreased from 2.6 million to 
2.2 million in 1972, Congress could not have been referring to 
the military.169
The congressional record is inconclusive. While it is clear 
that “military” was understood the same way in 1972 as it is 
today,170 and that Congress was aware that employment 
discrimination in the military was a problem,171 there is no 
165. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 1 (1971). 
166. 118 CONG. REC. 4922 (1972) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams). 
167. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 12 (1971); see also Czubkowski, supra note 43, at 1847. 
168. Czubkowski, supra note 43, at 1848–49. 
169. See Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D.Mo. 1977). 
170. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 89-718, at 8 (1965) (“military service”). 
171. A Bill to Further Promote Equal Employment Opportunities for American 
Workers: Hearing on H.R. 1746 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the H. 
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direct evidence on how Congress understood the terms “military 
departments,” “Army,” “Navy,” “Air Force,” or “employee.” 
Ancillary legislative evidence indicates both that Congress did 
intend to include the military within Title VII’s scope and that it 
did not. Using the legislative history to arrive at any definitive 
conclusion would thus be like looking over a crowd and picking 
out one’s friends.172 Analyses of the act’s text and underlying 
policies are more likely to prove useful in evaluating Title VII’s 
application to the military. 
C. Policies Underlying the Feres Doctrine 
The Feres Doctrine is employed by courts to bar 
servicepersons’ Title VII claims.173 The reasoning behind the 
doctrine is, first, that the military is constrained by “certain 
overriding demands of discipline and duty” which outweigh the 
rights of individuals;174 and, second, that the Constitution 
allocates responsibility for military affairs to Congress.175 The 
doctrine is usually used to assume away serviceperson’s claims 
rather than analyze them.176 As shown in Part II.A and II.B, the 
doctrine conflicts with both the text of Title VII and the statute’s 
broad remedial purpose. The policies which give rise to the Feres 
Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong. 373 (1971) (indicating that the military 
was required to receive approval from the Civil Service Commission to use tests in 
making employment decisions). 
172. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
173. See, e.g., Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 986 (1978). See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-95 (1953); Feres, v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Again, this Note uses “Feres Doctrine” to refer to 
both Feres and the broader Separate Community Doctrine. 
174. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 
137, 140 (1953)); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (“it is the 
primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars”) (quoting 
U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
744 (1974) (“the military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate 
discipline from that of the civilian”) (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 
(1953)). 
175. See, e.g., Johnson, 572 F.2d 1219 (citing separation of powers concerns); see also 
Griffin, supra note 17, at 2095 n.76. These constitutional considerations are 
discussed at length infra Part II.C.3. 
176. As one scholar has observed, “a judicial posture that defers almost entirely to 
the decisions and actions of the military establishment leaves little room for 
consideration of any competing individual rights.” Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-
Standing Army Tradition and the Separate Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135, 
224 (2006). The Feres Doctrine has been expanded over time, leaving even less room 
for individual rights. Id. at 136–38. 
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Doctrine should thus be able to withstand close scrutiny to 
justify abrogating both the letter of the law and the will of the 
legislature.177
1. The Historical Context of the Feres Doctrine 
The Feres Doctrine was first formulated during the 1950s.178
Since then, the policy considerations which may have once 
mitigated in its favor have either faded or been contradicted.179
In the mid-1950s, the battlefields of World War I and World War 
II were recent memories, military operations in Korea had only 
just been suspended, and the United States was embroiled in the 
Cold War.180 Employment discrimination was still legal, and 
segregation was widely practiced.181 Courts had numerous 
political and social reasons to prioritize military discipline at the 
expense of protecting servicepersons from discrimination. Today, 
however, physical deployment to a foreign front is relatively 
rare.182 Increasingly, military service involves technical and 
clerical work—work that resembles that performed in the 
private sector—as the military transitions to fight terrorism and 
other complex domestic and international threats.183 Title VII 
has been the law of the land for over fifty years,184 and 
segregation is widely regarded as a blot on the nation’s 
history.185
Feres was decided in 1950, and thus was not written with 
Title VII in mind.186 Instead, the doctrine first arose within the 
177. See, e.g., King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991) (statutes 
which benefit members of the military should be broadly construed); Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (remedial statutes should be broadly construed). 
178. See Feres, 340 U.S. 135; see also Orloff, 345 U.S. 83.
179. See infra Part II.C.2. 
180. See Burk & Espinoza, supra note 6, at 402. 
181. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1954). 
182. See Neale D. Guthrie, The Impact of Technological Change on Military 
Manpower in the 21st Century 51 (June 1990) (unpublished MA. thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a232472.pdf. 
183. Id. at 48–49. 
184. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2018)). 
185. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592–93 (1983) 
(describing segregation as a “pall” on the nation’s past). 
186. See Feres, v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see also Orloff v. Willoughby, 
345 U.S. 83 (1953). Orloff arose in the employment context, but it was likewise 
decided some time before Title VII was enacted.  
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context of federal liability for physical injuries sustained by 
soldiers during active-duty military service.187 Most physical 
injuries inflicted by an employer or its agent are the result of 
negligence rather than intentional misconduct; employment 
discrimination, however, is usually the result of animus. Even 
employment discrimination that is not intentional is not quite as 
innocent as the garden-variety negligence contemplated by 
Feres. Instead, it is “invidious” and is often the product of past 
discriminatory animus. 
The principal of stare decisis has played a large part in the 
survival of the Feres Doctrine.188 Departing from the doctrine, 
though, would not rob the Supreme Court of its capital or 
destabilize its jurisprudence. While the Court has upheld Feres 
in various contexts, it has not directly addressed whether the 
doctrine precludes servicepersons’ Title VII claims.189 Decisions 
which do cite to Feres tend to do so without much in the way of 
analysis.190 Letting a decision stand for its own sake may protect 
certain reliance interests, but that is not a good reason for 
clinging to an anachronistic policy.191 Feres is outdated, and 
courts should depart from it. 
2. Discrimination’s Effects on Discipline 
The main reason courts give for prohibiting servicepersons 
from seeking remedies under Title VII is that it will negatively 
affect military discipline, and that discipline is necessary to 
maintain national security.192 The second part of this statement 
187. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. These injuries might be inflicted by an adversary or 
by fellow-servicepersons. See id.
188. See, e.g., Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978). 
189. Id. 
190. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1983) (mentioning but not 
analyzing disciplinary considerations); Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1348, 1351 
(10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985) (1983 action touching upon 
concerns for discipline). 
191. United States v. Reliable Transfer, Co. 421 U.S. 397, 403 (1975) (overturning 
precedent may be appropriate when subsequent history and experience have eroded 
a rule’s foundations); Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L.
REV. 1035, 1090–94 (2013). 
192. Courts frequently state this maxim in their rulings, but they generally decline 
to support it with analysis, statistics, or even anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (“the military constitutes a specialized 
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian”); Burns v. 
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may be valid, but discriminatory employment practices actually 
undermine military discipline. 
Discrimination itself does not increase military discipline 
over either the short-run or the long-run. When an individual 
experiences or observes discrimination, antipathy and hostility 
are natural responses.193 These human responses sow discord 
and disunity among the ranks. The negative effects of 
discrimination are recognized by the branches of the armed 
forces, and each prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.194 Department of Defense 
regulations state that discrimination “is contrary to good order 
and discipline and is counterproductive to combat readiness and 
mission accomplishment.”195 Therefore, if officers or supervisory 
personnel do engage in unlawful discrimination, they are 
themselves contravening established policy and disregarding 
military discipline.196
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (members of the military are subject to “certain 
overriding demands of discipline and duty”). While the exigencies of war may create 
extenuating circumstances, history shows that war seldom justifies depriving 
individuals of important rights. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). Scholars have been 
more explicit in explaining the virtues of military discipline, which are essentially 
twofold. First, discipline acts as a necessary counterweight to human nature, which 
ordinarily urges servicepersons not to put their own lives in jeopardy and not to kill 
others. Second, discipline acts to prevent the armed forces from devolving into a mere 
mob. E.g., Col. Jeremy S. Weber, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and 
Discipline?, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123, 160–61 (2017). These considerations are 
largely inapplicable to employment discrimination, however. This is primarily 
because allowing Title VII suits will not diminish a serviceperson’s responsibility to 
follow orders at the time they are given.
193. See, e.g., Neslie A. Etheridge, Effects of Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S.
ARMY (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.army.mil/article/142799/effects_of_discrimination_in_the_workplace; 
Cassandra A. Okechukwu et al., Discrimination, Harassment, Abuse, and Bullying in 
the Workplace: Contribution of Workplace Injustice to Occupational Health 
Disparities, 57 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 573, 577 (2014). 
194. E.g., Equal Opportunity Branch (EO), U.S.  ARMY,
http://www.armyg1.army.mil/eo/default.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2019); Navy Sexual 
Harassment Prevention and Response and Equal Opportunity, U.S. NAVY,
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/support/21st_Century_Sailor/equal_opportunity/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2019); Equal Opportunity, U.S. AIR FORCE, https://www.af.mil/Equal-
Opportunity/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
195. DEP'T OF DEF. Directive 1350.2, The Department of Defense Military Equal 
Opportunity (MEO) Program (2015), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/135002p.pdf 
196. While it may be necessary for commanding officers to exercise their discretion 
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The adverse effects of discrimination are well-
documented.197 Discrimination increases incidences of employee 
stress, anxiety, depression, and suicide.198 It promotes fear, 
anger, and resentment among employees.199 It can lead to 
alcohol and tobacco use and numerous related health effects.200
It can independently affect blood pressure, heart-rate, etc.201
Discrimination results in increased absenteeism, lower quality 
work product, missed deadlines, needless turnover, and less-
qualified individuals receiving trainings, promotions, and 
leadership opportunities.202 Discrimination affects employees’ 
confidence in the fairness of workplace decisions and generally 
increases hostility in the work environment.203
The benefits of workplace diversity and inclusion are 
equally well-documented. Anti-discrimination policies directly 
increase discipline by improving morale and motivation.204
Increased diversity and inclusion create economies-of-scale, 
where diverse talents, skills, experiences, perspectives, and 
languages increase creativity and innovation and improve public 
in an emergency situation, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which unlawful
employment discrimination would ever be necessary—either during normal 
operations, combat, or emergencies. 
197. See, e.g., Etheridge, supra note 193 (describing these effects); Okechukwu et al., 
supra note 193 (same); Elizabeth A. Deitch et al., Subtle Yet Significant: The 
Existence and Impact of Everyday Racial Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 HUM.
REL. 1299 (2003) (same). These effects have long been recognized by military leaders, 
too. For example, General Douglas MacArthur once said that morale “will quickly 
wither and die if soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indifference or 
injustice on the part of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or 
ineptitude on the part of their military leaders.” See Griffin, supra note 17, at 2109 
(quoting Annual Report of the Chieft of Staff, U.S. Army, for the Fiscal Year ending 
June 30, 1933). 
198. Etheridge, supra note 193.  
199. See Okechukwu et al., supra note 193.  
200. Etheridge, supra note 193.  
201. See William A. Darity, Jr., Employment Discrimination, Segregation, and 
Health, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 226 (2003) (describing discrimination’s effects on 
health). 
202. See, e.g., Crosby Burns, The Costly Business of Discrimination: The Economic 
Costs of Discrimination and the Financial Benefits of Gay and Transgender Equality 
in the Workplace, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 2–3 (2012). 
203. Id. at 1.  
204. See, e.g., M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., THE BUSINESS IMPACT OF LGBT-
SUPPORTIVE WORKPLACE POLICIES (2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Business-Impact-of-LGBT-Policies-May-2013.pdf; Jennifer K. Brooke 
& Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A Review of the Psychological 
Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011); Swinton W. Hudson, Jr., Diversity in the 
Workforce, 3 J. EDUC. & HUM. DEV. 73 (2014). 
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perception.205 Prioritizing such beneficial policies could thus 
offset any negative effects on discipline. In other words, the 
military might find, as the private sector has, that it catches 
more flies with honey than it does with vinegar. 
Suits for employment discrimination under Title VII could 
be marginally disruptive to the military’s day-to-day 
operations.206 It is unlikely that such suits would be more 
disruptive than they are in the private sector or in federal 
civilian employment,207 but their consequences could be more 
severe. It does not follow, however, that discipline would 
necessarily decrease if servicepersons were afforded a Title VII 
remedy for discrimination. Just because a serviceperson has 
been discriminated against, or has initiated a claim, does not 
mean that serviceperson is then free to disobey orders—either 
while the claim is pending or after it has been adjudicated. 
Likewise, the mere existence of a claim would not be overly 
distracting to commanding officers or enlisted servicepersons 
since Title VII prohibits retaliation.208 Incidences of 
discrimination would likely diminish over time, and any 
negative effects on discipline would diminish with them. 
Prioritizing anti-discrimination policies and allowing a Title VII 
remedy for discrimination would thus likely have the net effect 
of increasing military discipline. 
3. Constitutional Considerations 
A secondary justification cited by most courts applying the 
Feres Doctrine is that military affairs are constitutionally 
allocated to Congress, and so judicial review of servicepersons’ 
claims is precluded by the Constitution’s separation of powers.209
This is simply policy dressed up as legal analysis. While it is 
205. See, e.g., Brooke & Tyler, supra note 204, at 726-29; Hudson, supra note 204, at 
73-75; Karen A. Jehn, Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and Productivity: A 
New Form of Organizing in the Twenty-First Century Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 473, 474 (1998). 
206. E.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-95 (1953). This line of argument often 
seems to assume that most discrimination suits are baseless, which is not necessarily 
true, but the point may be valid nonetheless. 
207. “Application of Title VII has not wrought havoc upon police or fire departments, 
hospitals, or other institutions that demand discipline from their employees.” Griffin, 
supra note 17, at 2105. 
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2018). 
209. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299 (1983). 
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true that the Constitution commands Congress to raise, support, 
and regulate the armed forces, it is emphatically—and 
inescapably—the province of the judiciary to say what the law is 
and to whom it applies.210 The judiciary has few qualms about 
reviewing decisions Congress makes pursuant to the commerce 
power, the taxing power, the spending power, or its other 
enumerated powers, and so refusing to review servicepersons’ 
employment claims on constitutional grounds is somewhat 
disingenuous.211 The Constitution designates the president as 
Commander in Chief over the armed forces, and so authority 
over the military is not solely allocated to the legislative 
branch.212 Allowing only administrative review of servicepersons’ 
discrimination claims is ineffective and raises its own 
independent separation of powers issues.213 It is close to a 
dereliction of duty for the judiciary to deny review of 
servicepersons’ claims simply because of their military status. 
Denying servicepersons remedies under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act also raises Fifth Amendment concerns. The 
Fifth Amendment proscribes the federal government from 
denying individuals the equal protection of federal laws.214
Servicepersons do not lose these protections simply because of 
their membership in the military.215 It would be incongruous to 
deprive members of the military of recourse for takings, 
constitutional torts, Fair Housing Act violations, and so on, and 
it is equally incongruous to deprive them of protections under 
Title VII.216
210. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
211. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
212. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
213. See infra Part I.C. 
214. U.S. CONST. amend. V. While the Fifth Amendment does not expressly provide 
for equal protection, the Supreme Court has held that equal protection is a 
component of due process in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954) (discussing 
equal protection in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause).  
215. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (invalidating a 
statute that differentiated between men and women for military allowance 
purposes). But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82-83 (1981) (upholding 
Congress’s allocation of funds to draft men but not women). 
216. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause protects citizens’ 
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
Servicepersons are deprived of due process when they receive only administrative 
review of constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 
Courts justify this by again citing to their unconvincing concerns over separation of 
powers. E.g., Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50, 66 (1982) (“the 
two powers are entirely independent”). 
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The constitutional half of the Feres Doctrine’s rationale is 
feeble. Given the changed circumstances since the doctrine’s 
inception and discrimination’s negative effects on morale and 
discipline, its policy justifications are equally tenuous. The 
foundations of Feres have thus been significantly eroded, and it 
is time for Congress and the courts to depart from the doctrine 
within the context of employment discrimination. 
D. Inconsistencies in the Lower Courts 
The tensions between the ordinary meaning of Title VII and 
the policy considerations that allegedly support the Feres
Doctrine have produced confusion and inconsistency in the 
federal courts. Though the Eighth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
arrive at the same conclusion regarding Title VII’s application to 
servicepersons, their rationales conflict. The Feres Doctrine’s 
blanket ban on servicepersons’ claims leads to uncertain 
application with regard to certain members of the National 
Guard, as well as with regard to members of the Public Health 
Service Commissioned Corps. This is an additional reason that 
courts and Congress should depart from Feres.
1. Inconsistent Rationales 
Because the rationale employed by the Eighth Circuit 
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, their consensus is 
largely illusory.217 In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit held that 
servicepersons are not employees, and so Title VII does not 
apply to them.218 The court reasoned that servicepersons do not 
enjoy the same mobility that private sector employees do, and 
they are subject to military discipline and military law.219 The 
court’s rationale is deficient for several reasons: first, while 
servicepersons may not enjoy employment at will, their 
relationship with the military is relatively permanent, which 
mitigates in favor of finding an employment relationship;220
217. Griffin, supra note 17, at 2093. 
218. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 986 (19780). 
219. Id. at 1223 n.4. 
220. See, e.g., United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947) (among other factors, 
courts determine whether a worker is an employee by weighing the “permanency of 
[the] relation[ship]”). 
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second, servicepersons receive pay in exchange for their labor, 
which also indicates that they are employees;221 and third, the 
Feres Doctrine’s concerns for discipline are outdated, 
unsupported, and largely erroneous.222
In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit held that servicepersons are 
not members of the “military departments,” and so Title VII does 
not apply to them.223 The court drew a tenuous distinction 
between the term “military departments” as it is used in Title 
VII and the term “armed forces,” which appears elsewhere in the 
United States Code, and found confirmation for this distinction 
in both the legislative history of Title VII and the Eighth 
Circuit’s holding in Johnson.224 This analysis is not only 
contrary to the ordinary meaning of the statute,225 it was also 
directly contradicted by the Eighth Circuit when it stated that 
the military departments “referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 include . . 
. uniformed personnel.”226
While the virtues of stare decisis may weigh in favor of 
overlooking these inconsistencies, the text of Title VII directly 
contradicts the judiciary’s current interpretation of the statute. 
The Feres Doctrine’s policy assumptions are no longer sufficient 
to justify this anomalous reading, and so Johnson and Gonzalez
should not be relied upon by future courts. 
2. Dual Status National Guard Technicians 
When the military exception to Title VII is applied to 
certain members of the National Guard, it returns confusing 
results.227 Many members of the National Guard work as 
technicians in support of the organization’s operations.228 These 
221. See infra Part II.A.3. 
222. See infra Part II.C.2. 
223. Gonzalez v. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928–29 (9th Cir. 1983). 
224. Id. at 927–28. 
225. See infra Part II.A. 
226. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 986 (1978). 
227. Much of this analysis also applies to reservists. But see Roper v. Dep’t of Army, 
832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987) (barring reservists from bringing Title VII claims). 
228. There were approximately 52,000 technicians employed by the National Guard 
in 2010. See Army Staff Sgt. Jim Greenhill, Dual-status Technicians Critical to 
Guard Missions, NAT’L GUARD BUREAU (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/577016/dual-status-
technicians-critical-to-guard-missions/. 
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individuals are employed directly by the federal government as 
civilians, but they are also required to enlist in the National 
Guard.229 Therefore, they are both members of the military and 
civilian employees.230 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a) states that “[f]or 
purposes of this section and any other provision of law, a 
military technician (dual status) is a Federal civilian 
employee.”231 Even though this section appears to include dual 
status technicians as civilian employees of the federal 
government, courts have nonetheless waivered on whether Title 
VII applies to them. 
The Federal Circuit has held that, because of their status as 
civilians, these members of the National Guard may state a 
claim under Title VII.232 In Jentoft, the Federal Circuit reasoned 
that the ordinary language of 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a) removes dual 
status technicians from the scope of any other provision of law, 
including the judge-made Feres Doctrine.233 The court found it 
significant that “there is no language in § 10216(a) limiting the 
circumstances in which a dual status technician can be 
considered a federal civilian employee.”234 The court held that 
“the broad and unambiguous language” of the enacted laws of 
Congress must preempt judge-made doctrines like Feres.235 Thus 
at least one circuit court has held that the Title VII claims of 
dual status employees are valid.236
Several circuit courts have indicated that Title VII only 
applies to guardmembers if the unlawful behavior arises out of 
the serviceperson’s civilian employment. The Eighth Circuit has 
229. 32 U.S.C. § 709(e)) (2018). 
230. These positions are referred to as “dual status” positions. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 
10216 (2018). 
231. 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a).  
232. Cf. Jentoft v. United States, 450 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
military reservist could pursue civilian remedies under the Equal Pay Act because of 
“dual status” under 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)). 
233. See id. at 1348; see also Daniel Lam, Wetherill v. Geren: The Eighth Circuit 
Erred by Applying the Feres Doctrine to Bar Dual Status Military Technicians from 
Bringing Civil Actions under Title VII, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 433, 455–57 (2012) 
(arguing that because the statute does not qualify its use of “any” it means “all”). 
234. Jentoft, 450 F.3d at 1348. 
235. Id. at 1349 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (Congress is 
authorized to regulate military justice)). 
236. The Federal Circuit also stated that dual status employees could not pursue 
claims that were essentially military in nature; for instance, claims “that relate to 
enlistment, transfer, promotion, suspension and discharge or that otherwise involve 
the military hierarchy” are not cognizable. Id. at 1345. 
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held that a claim challenging internal National Guard personnel 
decisions is invalid if it “involves an assessment of a 
[technician’s] military qualifications.”237 The Fifth Circuit has 
also suggested that actions which arise out of the scope of a 
guardmember’s civilian employment may state a claim under 
Title VII.238
Despite these indications, the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth 
Circuit have not really followed the dicta of their precedents, and 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jentoft is at odds with most of 
the other circuit courts. In 2008, the Fifth Circuit held that 
guardmembers’ claims are barred by the Feres Doctrine because 
the same disciplinary concerns that apply to other soldiers apply 
to dual status technicians.239 The Sixth Circuit has also held 
that the dual status technician position is one that is 
“irreducibly military in nature,” and thus that technicians’ Title 
VII claims are barred by Feres.240 The Ninth Circuit has found 
confirmation for these sentiments in legislative history.241 Thus, 
the Feres Doctrine’s application to dual status National Guard 
technicians has divided the circuits. 
3. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps 
Courts have also divided on Title VII’s application to 
members of the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps 
(PHSCC). The PHSCC is one of seven uniformed services of the 
237. Hupp v. Dep’t of the Army, 144 F.3d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasis 
added). 
238. See Brown v. U.S., 227 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2000) (“While these actions had a 
civilian component, in that [the guardmember’s] discharge made him ineligible for 
his civilian position, they nonetheless were actions taken within the military 
sphere.”) (finding for the defendant); see also Hunter v. Stetson, 444 F. Supp. 238, 
240 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (military demotion for actions taken as a civilian may implicate 
Title VII).
239. Walch v. Adjutant Gen. Dep’t of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 296–97 (5th Cir. 2008); see 
also Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1135 (1985) (extending this analysis to 1983 actions); Hawkins, supra note 67, 
at 125–27 (arguing that the same disciplinary concerns that apply to the military 
apply to the National Guard). 
240. Leistiko v. Stone, 134 F.3d 817, 820–21 (6th Cir. 1998). 
241. Zuress v. Donley, 606 F.3d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 2010) (using legislative history 
to contradict the plain language of 10 U.S.C. § 10216); see also Wetherill v. Geren, 
616 F.3d 789, 792-94 (8th Cir. 2010) (weighing several circuit court decisions against 
Jentoff).
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United States military.242 Its members wear Navy uniforms and 
often work alongside active-duty servicepersons to provide 
healthcare, prevent disease, and ensure food and drug safety 
during disasters.243 The PHSCC is a division of the Department 
of Health and Human Services, though,244 and courts differ on 
whether it is a military organization. 
The District of Columbia Circuit has held that PHSCC 
officers are distinct from members of the military.245 The court 
reasoned that: the PHSCC is an agency of the Department of 
Health and Human Services; the PHSCC is not included within 
the definition of “armed forces” found in 10 U.S.C. § 101; both 
the agency and its employees are free to terminate their 
employment relationship at any time; and the PHSCC is not a 
military service, and is not subject to the UCMJ unless the 
executive-in-chief declares otherwise.246 As such, the court 
allowed PHSCC officers to bring Title VII claims for 
discrimination.247
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has held that PHSCC 
officers are sufficiently similar to members of the military to 
subject them to the Feres Doctrine.248 The court reasoned that: 
the titles, ranks, pay systems, and benefits of PHSCC officers 
and military officers are substantially the same; service in the 
PHSCC can be designated as military service by the president if 
he or she chooses; and the PHSCC “is consistently included with 
the armed forces in statutory definitions of ‘uniformed 
242. Middlebrooks v. Leavitt, 525 F.3d 341, 343 (4th Cir. 2008). The others are the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and commissioned corps of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 
101(a)(4)–(5) (2018). 
243. COMMISSIONED CORPS OF THE U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., About Us, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.usphs.gov/aboutus/ (last visited June 5, 2019). 
The PHSCC also sometimes assigns its officers to serve with military personnel 
during times of war. John Parascandola, Militarization of the PHS Commissioned 
Corps (Sept. 2001), https://lhncbc.nlm.nih.gov/system/files/pub2001060.pdf.
244. See COMMISSIONED CORPS OF THE U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., Leadership, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.usphs.gov/aboutus/ (last visited June 5, 
2019).  
245. Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court decided this issue 
without addressing whether members of the military were barred from bringing Title 
VII claims. See id. 
246. Id. at 358–59. 
247. Id. at 359. 
248. Salazar v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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services.’”249 The Tenth Circuit also turned to legislative history 
to reinforce its conclusion that Congress intended to bar PHSCC 
officers from bringing Title VII claims.250
The Fourth Circuit has also held that PHSCC officers are 
not able to state a claim under Title VII by relying on 
congressional intent.251 In 1998, Congress enacted the Health 
Professions Education Partnerships Act, which provides that the 
“[a]ctive service of commissioned officers of the [PHSCC] shall be 
deemed to be active military service in the Armed Forces of the 
United States for purposes of all laws related to 
discrimination.”252 Rather than evaluate the Feres Doctrine’s 
application to PHSCC officers specifically, the Fourth Circuit 
chose to view this enactment as evidence of Congress’s intent to 
preclude the Title VII claims of all PHSCC officers—not just 
those engaged in active-duty military service.253
As the courts’ piecemeal application of Title VII to members 
of the PHSCC and the National Guard shows, the Feres Doctrine
has not been uniformly applied to all servicepersons. The 
doctrine conflicts with the plain language of Title VII and 
creates confusion. Many courts seem to sense this tension—
though most overlook it in favor of preserving the judiciary’s own 
capital. The analyses of the two leading decisions in the field 
differ, making their apparent consensus illusory. Feres leads to 
confusion and inconsistency when Title VII is applied to quasi-
military personnel. As such, the doctrine should be abandoned. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Title VII was enacted to combat discrimination in all its 
forms. It was amended to include employees of the military 
departments, which plainly includes servicepersons. The judicial 
branch has largely ignored the laws of Congress, however, in 
favor of a judge-made doctrine that is outdated and flawed. 
When Feres was decided, World War II had only just concluded, 
249. Id. at 530. But see Milbert, 830 F.2d at 358 (PHSCC not included within 
definition of “armed forces” found at 10 U.S.C. § 101 and elsewhere). 
250. Salazar, 787 F.2d at 531–33. 
251. Middlebrooks v. Leavitt, 525 F.3d 341, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2008). 
252. Health Professions Education Partnerships Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-392, 
112 Stat. 3524, 3588 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2018)). 
253. Middlebrooks, 525 F.3d at 347; see also Hedin v. Thompson, 355 F.3d 746, 748, 
750–51 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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and Title VII and the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act 
were unenacted. Today, Title VII has been the law for over fifty 
years; it has expressly included the military departments for 
over forty. Feres is premised on the idea that discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or other 
unlawful factors is desirable because it increases military 
discipline. History and experience have shown that this is not 
the case. In fact, discrimination decreases military discipline. 
The foundations of the Feres Doctrine are anachronistic and 
decaying. It is time for Congress and the courts to depart from 
Feres and allow a Title VII remedy for those who serve and 
protect this nation. 
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